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Abstract 
This study examined cross-sectional and prospective associations between cognitive 
appraisals and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms following stroke. While in 
hospital, stroke patients (n = 81) completed questionnaires assessing cognitive appraisals (i.e., 
negative cognitions about the self, negative cognitions about the world, and self-blame) and 
PTSD symptoms. PTSD symptoms were assessed again 3 months later when all patients had 
been discharged from hospital (n = 70). Significant correlations were found between the time 1 
measures of negative cognitions about the self and the world, but not self-blame, and the severity 
of PTSD symptoms measured at time 1 and at time 2. Regression analyses revealed that 
cognitive appraisals explained a significant amount of variance in the severity of PTSD 
symptoms at time 1, with negative cognitions about the self emerging as a significant predictor. 
In contrast, time 1 cognitive appraisals were unable to explain additional variance in time 2 
PTSD severity over and above that explained by time 1 PTSD severity. The findings therefore 
provide only weak support for Ehlers and Clark’s cognitive model of PTSD.  
Key words. PTSD, anxiety, depression, cognitive appraisals, stroke. 
 
  Stroke and PTSD 4
1.  Introduction 
 Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is described in the DSM-IV as ‘‘the development of 
characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct 
personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or 
other threat to one’s physical integrity”. [1] The characteristic symptoms include “persistent 
reexperiencing of the traumatic event, persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma 
and numbing of general responsiveness, and persistent symptoms of increased arousal” (APA, 
1994, p. 424). Research on PTSD has traditionally focused on traumas such as war, physical and 
sexual assaults, and road traffic accidents. However, recent research has documented the 
existence of PTSD symptoms following a range of medical events (Tedstone & Tarrier, 2003) 
including cancer (e.g., Kangas, Henry & Bryant, 2003), myocardial infarction (MI) (e.g., Kutz, 
Shabtai, Solomon, Neumann & David, 1994), and subarachnoid haemorrhage (e.g., Berry, 1998). 
The present study extends this work by focusing on PTSD symptoms following stroke. A stroke 
occurs when the normal blood supply to the brain is disrupted causing cells in the affected area 
to become damaged or die. Stroke is the third most common cause of death, and the most 
common cause of severe disability, in the UK. A stroke “is a frightening experience” with the 
symptoms (e.g., weakness or numbness down one side of the body or face, problems with 
balance and coordination, problems with communication, confusion) appearing suddenly and 
without warning (Stroke Association, 2006). Thus a stroke has many of the characteristics of 
events likely to trigger PTSD symptoms, in that it is unexpected, uncontrollable and potentially 
life threatening. 
 Previous research has estimated the prevalence of PTSD following stroke to be between 
10-31%, depending on the method of assessment (Bruggimann et al., 2006; Merriman, Norman 
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& Barton, 2007; Sembi, Tarrier, O’Neill, Burns & Farragher, 1998). PTSD symptom severity has 
been found to be independent of age, marital status, memory deficits, neurological impairment, 
post-stroke disability, and dissociation (Bruggimann et al., 2006; Merriman et al., 2007; Sembi et 
al., 1998). Instead, a number of factors have been found to be associated with the severity of 
PTSD symptoms including gender, education, number of previous strokes, time since stroke 
(negative relationship), neuroticism, negative affect and retrospective perceptions of the stroke 
(e.g., fear, helplessness), although anxiety and depression have been found to be the most 
consistent correlates of the severity of post-stroke PTSD symptoms (Bruggimann et al., 2006; 
Merriman et al., 2007; Sembi et al., 1998). However, previous studies predicting post-stroke 
PTSD have suffered from a number of limitations. First, they have employed cross-sectional 
designs, thereby limiting conclusions that can be made regarding the direction of the 
relationships. Second, they have failed to draw upon recent cognitive models of PTSD which 
highlight the importance of cognitive appraisals in the development and persistence of PTSD 
(see Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  
Foa and Rothbaum (1998) highlight two cognitions that may contribute to the 
development of PTSD; namely, that the world is extremely dangerous and that the self is totally 
incompetent. Similarly, Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that persistent PTSD occurs when the 
trauma and/or its sequelae is processed in such a way that leads to a sense of serious current 
threat. This threat can be external (e.g., the world is a more dangerous place) or internal (e.g., the 
person no longer views himself or herself as capable/ competent). Ehlers and Clark (2000) 
outline two processes that can lead to this sense of serious current threat: (i) excessively negative 
appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae and (ii) disturbances in autobiographical memory. 
The present study focuses on the first of these processes. Previous research in non-medical 
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contexts has identified significant relationships between a range of negative appraisals (e.g., 
about oneself, one’s world, one’s future, interpretations of intrusive memories, perceptions of 
permanent change, the responses of others and anger) and the severity of PTSD symptoms 
following a variety of traumatic events (e.g., Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers, 2001; Ehlers, Mayou & 
Bryant, 2003; Fairbrother & Rachman, 2006; Mayou, Ehlers & Bryant, 2002).  
A recent collaboration between the Foa and Ehlers research groups sought to consolidate 
this work through the development of the Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory; a reliable and 
valid measure of trauma-related appraisals (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin & Orsillo, 1999). In 
particular, they identified three types of appraisals that may be associated with PTSD: (i) 
negative cognitions about the self (e.g., “I am inadequate”), (ii) negative cognitions about the 
world (e.g., “The world is a dangerous place”), and (iii) self-blame (e.g., “The event happened 
because of the way I acted”) (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin & Orsillo, 1999). A number of studies 
have examined relationships between these appraisals and the severity of PTSD symptoms. Foa 
et al. (1999) reported strong, and significant, correlations between all three cognitive appraisals 
and the severity of PTSD symptoms in a sample of trauma survivors (including accidents, non-
sexual assaults, sexual assaults, and illness). Considering studies in medical contexts, Angar, 
Kennedy and King (2006) found that negative cognitions about the self and the world, but not 
self-blame, were associated with the severity of PTSD symptoms among a sample of patients 
with spinal cord injuries. Similar results have been reported by Kangas et al. (2005) who found 
that negative cognitions about the self and the world assessed within one month of cancer 
diagnosis were associated with the severity of PTSD symptoms six months following diagnosis, 
whereas the correlation between self-blame and PTSD severity was non-significant. These 
studies provide initial evidence that the cognitive appraisals outlined by Foa et al. (1999) are 
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associated with PTSD symptom severity, although the use of cross-sectional and retrospective 
designs is a limitation of some of this research. Thus, further research is required to ascertain 
whether these cognitive appraisals are able to explain variance in the severity of PTSD 
symptoms over and above that explained by initial symptoms.  
The present study therefore sought to assess cross-sectional and prospective associations 
between cognitive appraisals and PTSD symptoms following stroke. Patients who recently had a 
stroke completed questionnaires while in hospital and again three months later when they had 
been discharged from hospital. In line with Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD, 
it was predicted that negative appraisals (i.e., negative cognitions about the self, negative 
cognitions about the world, and self-blame) would explain variance in the severity of PTSD 
symptoms, both cross-sectionally and prospectively, following stroke. A range of demographic 
(e.g., age, gender), medical (e.g., time since stroke, number of previous strokes) and 
psychological (e.g., anxiety, depression) variables were also assessed to control for the effects of 
these factors in the regression analyses. 
2.  Method 
2.1  Participants and Procedure 
Ethical approval was obtained from the local NHS Research Ethics Committee. Male and 
female adults (>18 years) who had recently experienced a stroke were recruited from the stroke 
wards of a NHS University Teaching Hospital in the UK. Patients who were unable to complete 
the questionnaire themselves due to cognitive impairment resulting from stroke (e.g., aphasia) 
and patients experiencing acute medical problems were excluded. Stroke nurse coordinators 
identified potential patients (i.e., those who met the inclusion criteria) and provided them with an 
information sheet. Patients who gave initial verbal consent were then approached by the lead 
  Stroke and PTSD 8
researcher who outlined the aims of the study. Upon gaining written informed consent, patients 
were asked to completed the time 1 questionnaire. Time 2 questionnaires were sent out to 
participants’ home addresses 3 months later. Before these were sent out, patients’ general 
practitioners were contacted to ascertain that they were still alive. Participants were telephoned 
to ensure they had received the questionnaire and to answer any questions. If questionnaires were 
not returned within 21 days, a second questionnaire was sent out. 
Of the 90 eligible patients approached by the researcher, 9 declined to participate in the 
research. Eighty-one patients were therefore recruited into the study. It was possible to follow-up 
70 (86%) of the initial 81 patients at 3 months, all of whom had been discharged from hospital. 
Of the 11 patients for whom it was not possible to collect time 2 data, 3 had died, 4 had been re-
admitted to hospital and 2 had specified that they did not want to be contacted at follow-up. No 
significant differences were found between those patients who provided data at time 2 (n = 70) 
and those who did not (n = 11) in terms of demographic and clinical variables, and responses to 
the time 1 measures detailed below. 
2.2  Measures 
 The time 1 questionnaire, which was completed in hospital, contained measures of 
cognitive appraisals, anxiety, depression and PTSD symptoms. The time 2 questionnaire at 3 
month follow-up only assessed PTSD symptoms. 
 The Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa et al., 1999) is a 33 item measure 
that includes three scales assessing (i) negative cognitions about the self (e.g., “I feel like I don’t 
know myself anymore”) (21 items), (ii) negative cognitions about the world (e.g., “I have to be 
especially careful because you never know what can happen next”) (7 items), and (iii) self-blame 
for the trauma (e.g., “Somebody else would not have gotten into this situation”) (5 items). 
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Respondents were instructed to answer the items in relation to their stroke and to provide their 
responses on 7-point response scales (totally disagree-totally agree). The scales have been found 
to have excellent internal consistency with Foa et al. (1999) suggesting that they may be 
shortened for research purposes, such as predictive studies of PTSD. A shortened version (7 
items) of the negative cognitions about the self scale was therefore used in the current study, 
based on the factor loadings reported by Foa et al. (1999). Reponses to the items in each scale 
were averaged for data analysis. The scales were found to have satisfactory internal reliability in 
the current study (αs = .83, .83, .70, respectively).  
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a 14-
item questionnaire comprising separate measures of anxiety (e.g., “I get sudden feelings of 
panic”) and depression (e.g., “I look forward with enjoyment to things”). Each sub-scale 
contains seven items scored on 4-point response scales (e.g., 0 = not at all to 3 = very often 
indeed). Reponses to the items are coded and summed such that scores on each scale can range 
from 0 to 21 with high scores indicating high levels of anxiety and depression. Both the anxiety 
(α = .86) and depression (α = .78) subscales were found to have satisfactory internal reliability in 
the current study.  
The Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 1995; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox & Perry, 
1997) includes 17 items, rated on 4-point response scales (i.e., 0  = not at all or only once to 3 = 
5 or more times a week/almost always), to measure the severity of the PTSD symptoms in the 
past month. The items assess the extent to which respondents have been bothered by re-
experiencing (e.g., “Having bad dreams or nightmares about the event”), avoidance (e.g., 
“Trying not to think about, talk about, or have feelings about the event”) and arousal (e.g., 
“Feeling irritable or having fits of anger”) symptoms, as detailed in DSM-IV. In the present 
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study, respondents were instructed to answer the items in relation to their stroke. Responses to 
the 17 items are summed to provide a measure of PTSD symptom severity which can be rated by 
pre-defined categories: Mild = 1-10, Moderate = 11-20, Moderate to Severe = 21-35, and Severe  
≥ 36 (Foa, 1995). The PDS has been reported to have excellent internal reliability, as was also 
found in the current study at time 1 (α = .89) and time 2 (α = .91). The PDS has been shown to 
have good sensitivity (0.89) and specificity (0.75) when compared against the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV (Foa et al., 1997). 
A range of demographic (i.e., age, gender, education level, marital status) and medical 
(i.e., time since stroke, number of previous strokes, consciousness at time of stroke) variables 
were also assessed.  
3.  Results 
3.1  Data Screening 
Prior to analysis the data were examined for the assumptions of multivariate analysis 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Scores on a number of the measures were positively skewed, 
including negative cognitions about the self (z = 3.18, p < .001), self-blame (z = 3.92, p < .001), 
time 1 PDS severity (z = 5.36, p < .001) and time 2 PDS severity (z = 3.46, p < .001). Square root 
transformations reduced levels of skewness to non-significance and were used in subsequent 
analyses. No evidence of multicollinearity was found among the independent variables used in 
the regression analyses. 
3.2  Sample Characteristics  
Participants ranged in age from 39 - 94 years (M = 71.23, SD = 11.74), and included 43 
males and 38 females. The majority categorized themselves as white British (n = 74). Just over 
half were married (n = 44) or cohabiting (n = 3), while the remaining participants were either 
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widowed (n = 25), divorced/separated (n = 4) or single (n = 5). The mean age of leaving full-
time education was 14.97 years (SD = 1.49). The mean number of strokes ranged from 1 to 4 (M 
= 1.30, SD = 0.56) with time since the most recent stroke ranging from 2 to 120 days (M = 19.94, 
SD = 22.66). Most participants (n = 55) were conscious at the time of their stroke, although 7 
were unconscious and 12 were asleep (missing data, n = 7). The mean PDS severity score at time 
1 (M = 9.32, SD = 8.73) was near the top of the mild symptom severity range, as described by 
Foa (1995), whereas at time 2 it was within the moderate symptom severity range (M = 11.93, 
SD = 10.47). However, there was no difference between the means of the time 1 and time 2 
severity scores, t(69) = 1.54, p = .13.  
3.3  Correlation Analyses 
Correlations were computed between the demographic, medical and psychological 
variables and PDS severity at time 1 and time 2 (see Table 1). Considering the demographic and 
medical variables, only age was found to correlate significantly with time 1 PDS severity. 
However, subsequent analyses revealed the presence of three (younger) outliers that, when 
removed, reduced the correlation between age and time 1 PDS severity to non-significance, r(76) 
= -.13, p = .24. Considering the psychological variables, anxiety and depression were found to 
correlate significantly with both time 1 and time 2 PDS severity, as did negative cognitions about 
the self and negative cognitions about the world. In contrast, the correlations between self-blame 
and PDS severity were non-significant. Finally, time 1 PDS severity was found to correlate 
significantly with time 2 PDS severity. 
3.4  Regression Analyses  
 The ability of the PTCI measures to explain variance in PDS severity scores at time 1 was 
assessed through a hierarchical regression analysis in which the independent variables were 
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entered in a two blocks (see Table 2). Given their significant correlations with time 1 PDS 
severity, anxiety and depression were entered in block 1, followed by the PTCI measures (i.e., 
negative cognitions about the self, negative cognitions about the world, self-blame) in block 2. 
The variables entered in the first block were able to explain 36% of the variance in time 1 PDS 
severity scores, R2 = .36, F(2,78) = 23.42, p < .001, although only anxiety emerged as a 
significant predictor. The addition of the PTCI measures resulted in a significant increment in the 
amount of variance explained, R2 = .09, ∆F(3,75) = 4.18, p = .009, with negative cognitions 
about the self emerging as a significant predictor along with anxiety. The variables in the final 
regression equation were able to explain 47% of the variance in time 1 PDS severity scores, 
F(5,75) = 13.03, p < .001.  
 A second hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to assess the ability of the 
baseline PTCI measures to explain variance in time 2 PDS severity scores, controlling for time 1 
severity scores. The independent variables were entered in three blocks: (i) time 1 PDS severity, 
(ii) anxiety and depression and (iii) negative cognitions about the self, negative cognitions about 
the world, and self-blame (see Table 3). In this way it was possible to test the ability of the PTCI 
measures to predict time 2 PDS severity over and above the effect of baseline PDS severity 
scores as well as anxiety and depression which were found to correlate with time 2 PDS severity. 
Time 1 PDS severity explained 17% of the variance in time 2 PDS severity scores, R2 = .17, 
F(1,68) = 13.95, p < .001. Neither the addition of anxiety and depression at step 2, ∆R2 = .03, 
∆F(2,66) = 1.13, p = .33, nor the addition of the PTCI measures at step 3, ∆R2 = .04, ∆F(3,63) = 
1.07, p = .37, produced a significant increment in the amount of variance explained. However, 
the previously significant effect of time 1 PDS severity became non-significant when these 
variables were added. The variables in the final regression equation were able to explain 24% of 
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the variance in time 2 PDS severity scores, F(6,63) = 3.25, p = .008, although none of the 
independent variables made a significant contribution to the regression equation. [2] 
4.  Discussion  
 The current study assessed both cross-sectional and prospective associations between 
cognitive appraisals and PTSD symptoms following stroke. In line with Ehlers and Clark’s 
(2000) cognitive model of PTSD, negative cognitions about the self and the world were found to 
correlate with the severity of PTSD symptoms both cross-sectionally, at time 1, and 
prospectively, at 3 month follow-up. In contrast, self-blame was unrelated to the severity of 
PTSD symptoms at both time points. The present results are similar to those reported in other 
medical contexts by Agar et al. (2006), in relation to spinal cord injuries, and by Kangas et al. 
(2005), in relation to cancer diagnosis. However, these results can be contrasted with those 
reported by Foa et al. (1999) who found significant correlations between all three cognitive 
appraisals and the severity of PTSD symptoms in a sample of trauma survivors (including 
accidents, non-sexual assaults, sexual assaults, and illness).  
The non-significant correlations found for self-blame in the present study may reflect the 
nature of the trauma event, i.e., a stroke. First, compared to other traumatic events, such as 
sexual/physical assaults and road traffic accidents, the causes of a stroke are likely to be more 
distal. Thus, the main risk factors for stroke centre on various lifestyle factors including exercise, 
diet, smoking and alcohol consumption. In contrast, the causes of other trauma events, that have 
traditionally been the focus of PTSD research, may be more proximal in nature centring, for 
example, on what the person was doing just before the event. Second, stroke may have more 
similarities with natural disasters (i.e., “acts of God’) than with interpersonal traumas (e.g., 
physical assaults) where specific individuals and/or actions can be readily identified as potential 
  Stroke and PTSD 14
causes of the event. Thus, given the nature of the trauma event, issues of self-blame may be less 
relevant to the psychological reactions of stroke patients than of other trauma survivors.  
 Regression analyses revealed that at time 1 (i.e., cross-sectionally) the cognitive appraisal 
measures explained a significant amount of the variance in the severity of PTSD symptoms, 
although only negative cognitions about the self made a significant contribution to the regression 
equation. Interestingly, this effect occurred despite controlling for the effects of anxiety and 
depression which have been found to consistently correlate with post-stroke PTSD symptom 
severity in previous studies (Bruggimann et al., 2006; Merriman et al., 2007; Sembi et al., 1998). 
In contrast, the baseline measures of cognitive appraisals were unable to explain additional 
variance in the severity of time 2 PTSD symptoms after controlling for baseline PTSD symptom 
severity. Similar results have been reported by Kangas et al. (2005) who found that negative 
cognitions about the self failed to emerge as a significant predictor of PTSD severity at six 
months following cancer diagnosis when entered into a regression analysis with a range of 
demographic, medical and psychological variables (i.e., age, gender, treatment complications, 
peritraumatic dissociation, anxiety, depression, social support), including Acute Stress Disorder, 
assessed at one month. Overall, the present findings provide only weak support for Ehlers and 
Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD. 
The current findings are of theoretical importance as they provide the first prospective 
investigation of the predictors of the severity of post-stroke PTSD symptoms as well as the first 
test of the Ehlers and Clark (2000) cognitive model of PTSD following stroke. However, it is 
clear that further, prospective, tests of the Ehlers and Clark (2000) model are required to assess 
the ability of cognitive appraisals to predict PTSD symptom severity, controlling for the effect of 
initial symptoms. In addition, future research attention should also focus on the mechanisms 
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through which negative cognitions may lead to the development and persistence of PTSD 
symptoms. For example, Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that negative cognitions are likely to 
lead to various behavioural and cognitive coping strategies which, although intended to control 
the sense of current threat, may actually exacerbate PTSD symptoms. For example, a negative 
view of oneself (e.g., “My reactions since the event mean that I am going crazy”) and/or self-
blame (e.g., “The event happened because of the way I acted”) may lead to excessive rumination 
which may provide internal retrieval cues that trigger re-experiencing symptoms (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). Similarly, negative cognitions about the world (e.g., “I have to be especially 
careful because you never know what can happen next”) may lead to avoidance and safety 
behaviors that serve to maintain a sense of serious current threat by preventing disconfirmation 
of negative beliefs (Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers, 1999). Interestingly, a number of studies have 
reported associations between such dysfunctional coping strategies and the severity of PTSD 
symptoms (e.g., Dunmore et al., 2001; Ehlers et al.,  2003; Mayou et al., 2002).  
The current study represents only a partial test of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model. In 
addition to the role of negative cognitive appraisals, the model proposes that disturbances in 
autobiographical memory are also important in the development and persistence of PTSD. For 
example, one factor that may lead to the trauma memory being poorly elaborated and 
inadequately integrated with other autobiographical memories is dissociation during and 
immediately after the trauma event, and a range of evidence has linked dissociation with PTSD 
symptom severity (e.g., Ehlers et al., 2003; Kangas et al., 2005). On a related point, only 55 of 
the sample were conscious at the time of their stroke, with 7 being unconscious and 12 asleep. 
As result, some patients may have had little or no recollection of their stroke. There has been 
considerable debate regarding whether or not PTSD symptoms can develop under such 
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circumstances (Harvey, Brewin, Jones & Kopelman, 2003; Klein, Caspi & Gil, 2003), with 
recent research producing conflicting findings (e.g., Caspi, Gil, Ben-Ari, Koren, Aaron-Peretz & 
Klein, 2005; Creamer, O’Donnell & Pattison, 2005). In the present study, consciousness at the 
time of stroke was found to be unrelated to PTSD symptom severity. One explanation for such a 
finding is that impaired consciousness may not last throughout the trauma experience and that 
PTSD symptoms may develop in relation to those aspects of the trauma experience that 
individuals are able to encode (Creamer et al., 2005). Alternatively, it is possible that processing 
of the trauma experience may occur at an implicit level during periods of impaired consciousness 
(Bryant, 2001). 
There are a number of study limitations that should be noted. First, the sample size was 
relatively small which may have reduced the power of the regression analyses, especially at time 
2. [3] It is therefore important for future work to replicate the current findings with larger sample 
sizes. Second, given the restricted ethnic range of the sample, the generalisability of the current 
findings may be limited. Third, it is possible that, in addition to the potentially traumatic nature 
of the stroke, patients’ responses to the PDS may also be influenced by secondary appraisals 
regarding ongoing disability, although previous studies have shown levels of post-stroke 
disability to be unrelated to PTSD symptom severity (e.g., Merriman et al., 2007; Sembi et al., 
1998). Fourth, the identification of PTSD symptoms following medical events, such as stroke, is 
further complicated by high co-morbidity with other emotional disorders such as anxiety and 
depression (Shalev, Schreiber, Galai & Melmed, 1993) which could elevate PDS scores and/or 
lead to the symptoms of PTSD being misinterpreted and the disorder being unrecognised or 
under-diagnosed in clinical practice (Zimmerman & Mattia, 1999).  
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Notwithstanding the study limitations, the current findings are of clinical importance. In 
particular, PTSD may interfere with rehabilitation programs and thereby impair adjustment 
(Williams, 1997). For example, PTSD has been linked with nonadherence to medication and 
adverse clinical outcomes in MI patients (Shemesh et al., 2001). Given that stroke patients are 
required to adhere to exercise/physiotherapy as well as medication as part of their rehabilitation 
programs, it is important to identify and treat at risk patients. Current guidelines in the UK 
recommend trauma-related cognitive behavioural therapy for persistent PTSD (NICE, 2005) as 
also recommended by Nemeroff et al. (2006) in their recent review of work on PTSD. On the 
basis of the present findings, negative cognitions about the self and, to a lesser extent, the world 
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Footnotes 
1. PTSD symptoms may also develop following witnessing (or learning about) an extreme 
traumatic event that affects another person (or family member/close associate).   
2. Recent work (e.g., Marshall, Schell, Glynn & Shetty, 2006) has highlighted the 
importance of distinguishing between the individual PTSD symptom clusters (i.e., re-
experiencing, avoidance and arousal). The correlation and regression analyses were therefore 
repeated considering each symptom cluster in turn. The pattern of results remained the same for 
each symptom cluster and therefore, for the sake of brevity, only the results pertaining to total 
PDS symptom severity scores are reported.  
3. A power analysis was conducted to examine the ability of the PTCI measures to explain 
additional variance in time 2 PDS severity scores after controlling for the effect of 1 PDS 
severity, anxiety and depression. The PTCI measures were only able to explain a small additional 
amount of variance in time 2 PDS severity scores (∆R2 = .04, f2 = .05) (Cohen, 1992). The power 
analysis also revealed that the time 2 sample size (n = 70) was sufficient to detect a medium 
effect size (f2 = .17, which equates to ∆R2 = .11) with power set at .80 and alpha set at .05. These 
analyses suggest that the inability of the PTCI measures to explain additional variance in time 2 
PDS severity scores is due to their small effect, rather than to an insufficient number of 
participants.  
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Table 1 
Correlations Between the Independent Variables and (Time 1 and Time 2) PDS Severity 
 
Variable 
Time 1  
PDS severity 
Time 2  
PDS severity 
Age -.23* -.23 
Gender  .13  .18 
Marital status  .18  .14 
Education level  .19  .02 
Number of previous strokes   .17  .04 
Time since stroke  .09  .03 
Consciousness at time of stroke -.06 -.11 
Anxiety  .60***  .34** 
Depression   .45***  .37*** 
PTCI - Self subscale  .56***  .39*** 
PTCI - World subscale  .38***  .36*** 
PTCI - Self-blame subscale  .13  .02 
Time 1 PDS severity    –   .41*** 
 
Note. Variables were coded as follows. Gender: 1 = male, 2 = female; marital status:  
1 = single/divorced/widowed, 2 = married/cohabiting; consciousness at time of stroke;  
1 = unconscious/asleep, 2 = conscious. Time 1 N = 81. Time 2 N = 70. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
*** p < .001 
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Table 2 
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 1 PDS Severity (N = 81)  
  Variable     B   SE B    ß 
Step 1 
   
  Anxiety   .18  .04  .51*** 
  Depression   .06  .04  .16 
Step 2    
  Anxiety   .16  .04  .44*** 
  Depression  -.005  .04 -.01 
  PTCI - Self subscale  1.44  .50  .38** 
  PTCI - World subscale  -.01  .12 -.01 
  PTCI - Self-blame subscale  -.06  .35 -.01 
 
Note.  R2 = .37 for Step 1, p < .001 ; ∆R2 = .09 for Step 2, p = .009.  
** p < .01.  *** p < .001.  
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Table 3 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Time 2 PDS Severity 
(N = 70) 
  Variable     B   SE B    ß 
Step 1 
   
  Time 1 PDS Severity   .46  .12  .41*** 
Step 2     
  Time 1 PDS Severity   .30  .17  .27 
  Anxiety   .03  .06  .07 
  Depression   .07  .06  .17 
Step 3    
  Time 1 PDS Severity   .23  .18  .21 
  Anxiety   .02  .06  .04 
  Depression   .05  .06  .12 
  PTCI - Self subscale   .40  .76  .10 
  PTCI - World subscale   .19  .17  .16 
  PTCI - Self-blame subscale  -.48  .53 -.11 
 
Note.  R2 = .17 for Step 1, p < .001 ; ∆R2 = .03 for Step 2, p = .33.  
∆R2 = .04 for Step 2, p = .37. *** p < .001.   
 
 
